Security analysis of smartcard to card reader communications for biometric cardholder authentication by Rila, Luciano & Mitchell, Chris J
Security analysis of smartcard to card reader communications for
biometric cardholder authentication
Luciano Rila and Chris J. Mitchell
Information Security Group
Royal Holloway, University of London
Surrey TW20 0EX, UK.
luciano.rila@rhul.ac.uk and c.mitchell@rhul.ac.uk
Abstract
The use of biometrics, and fingerprint recognition in
particular, for cardholder authentication in smart-
card systems is growing in popularity. In such
a biometrics-based cardholder authentication sys-
tem, sensitive data may be transferred between the
smartcard and the card reader. In this paper we
identify and classify possible threats to the commu-
nications link between card and card reader during
cardholder authentication. We also analyse the im-
pact of these threats. We consider five different ar-
chitectures and use the threat analysis to indicate
the relative security of the various possible architec-
tures.
1 Introduction
1.1 Biometrics and smartcards
Biometrics has been widely recognised as a power-
ful tool for problems requiring personal identifica-
tion. Most automated identity authentication sys-
tems in use today rely on either the possession of a
token (magnetic card, USB token) or the knowledge
of a secret (password, PIN) to establish the iden-
tity of an individual. The main problem with these
traditional approaches to identity authentication is
that tokens or PIN/passwords can be lost, stolen,
forgotten, misplaced, guessed, or willingly given to
an unauthorised person. Biometric authentication,
on the other hand, is based on physiological or be-
havioural characteristics of the individual, such as
fingerprints, and therefore does not suffer from the
disadvantages of the traditional methods.
In parallel, smartcards have steadily become more
popular. Their increasing storage capacity and pro-
cessing capabilities have enabled their deployment
in a widening range of applications, varying from
support for PKI to decentralised systems requiring
off-line transactions [1, 2, 3]. Generally any ap-
plication using smartcards requires a method for
cardholder authentication, and biometrics-based au-
thentication has emerged as an appropriate technol-
ogy.
Combining the security of biometrics and the com-
puting power of a smartcard is a very elegant so-
lution to cardholder authentication. On the one
hand biometrics can provide the level of security
required by applications using smartcards. On the
other hand, smartcards enable the biometrics tech-
nology by offering a secure and portable way of stor-
ing the biometrics template, which would otherwise
need to be stored in a central database. Fingerprint
recognition appears particularly appropriate for use
in biometric systems using smartcards.
A smartcard system is composed of two main
physical units: the smartcard itself and the card
reader. In biometrics-based cardholder authenti-
cation, transmission of sensitive data between the
smartcard and the card reader may occur depending
on how the biometric system is distributed between
these two units. In this paper, we consider the secu-
rity issues associated with the communications link
between the smartcard and the card reader during
the biometrics-based cardholder authentication pro-
cess.
Before we set out the objectives of this paper in
detail, it is important to clarify the biometrics-based
cardholder authentication process.
1.2 General model for biometric au-
thentication
According to [4], a general biometric system is com-
posed of the following logical modules:
1. Data collection subsystem;
2. Signal processing subsystem;
3. Matching subsystem;
4. Storage subsystem;
5. Decision subsystem;
6. Transmission subsystem.
The data collection subsystem contains the input
device or sensor that captures the biometric infor-
mation from the user. It is the link between the
physical domain and the logical domain. The sig-
nal processing subsystem receives the raw biomet-
ric data from the data collection subsystem and ex-
tracts the distinguishing features from the raw data,
transforming it into the form required for match-
ing. The matching subsystem receives the processed
data from the signal processing subsystem and com-
pares it with the biometric template retrieved from
the storage subsystem. The matching subsystem
measures the similarity of the submitted biometric
sample with an enrolled reference template. Each
comparison yields a score, which is a numeric value
indicating how closely the submitted sample and the
reference template match. The decision subsystem
receives the score from the matching subsystem and,
using a confidence value based on security risks and
risk policy, interprets the result of the score, thus
reaching an authentication decision. The transmis-
sion subsystem provides the system the ability to
exchange information between all other subsystems.
Figure 1 shows a block diagram for the general bio-
metric authentication model.
Note that these are logical modules, and therefore
some systems may integrate several of these compo-
nents into one physical unit.
1.3 Scope and purpose
In this paper we focus on the security issues asso-
ciated with the communications link between the
smartcard and the card reader during fingerprint-
based cardholder authentication. PIN-based card-
holder authentication has been well researched and
understood, giving rise to a variety of industry stan-
dards, such as [5, 6, 7]. Encryption is typically used
to provide security for PINs during transmission,
either from the keypad to the card (for local card-
holder authentication) or from the keypad to a re-
mote server (for remote authentication of the card-
holder).
However, for the purposes of our analysis, we do not
make any assumptions about encryption or other
cryptographic protection of the card/card reader
communications link. This is because, whereas PINs
are very short, biometric samples, e.g. fingerprint
images, are rather large, and the limited compu-
tational and storage capabilities of the card may
severely limit the possibilities for such protection.
Given our focus on card/reader communications,
and the objective of assessing the best level of inte-
gration of the biometric technology, we make certain
other simplifying assumptions. We assume that the
smartcard is a tamper-proof device and any trans-
mission between biometric system modules taking
place within the card is therefore secure. We do not
discuss the impact of using fake biometrics, such as
plastic fingers, to fool the system, although it was
shown in [8] that this is a possible attack with the
current technology. We feel that this issue concerns
fingerprint-based biometric technology in a wider
sense and is therefore beyond the scope of our dis-
cussion.
In previous related work [9], a number of weaknesses
in the biometric system model have been identified,
and countermeasures suggested. However, in that
analysis no assumptions as to the actual architec-
ture of the system are made, and the analysis is
rather general in nature. By contrast, the main pur-
pose of this paper is to understand what security
gains can be made from the various possible levels
of integration of the biometric system on the smart-
card.
Depending on how the logical modules of the bio-
metric system are distributed between the smart-
card and the card reader, different threats may arise.
We consider five scenarios for the biometric system
and, for each scenario, we identify and classify pos-
sible threats to the communications link and assess
the impact of these threats. In all scenarios we as-
sume that the smartcard stores the template for the
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Figure 1: General model for biometric authentication.
cardholder fingerprint. We also assume throughout
that fingerprint recognition is used as a method of
cardholder authentication to the smartcard.
In Section 2 we describe the five biometric system
architectures considered in this paper. In Section
3, we discuss the sources of communications link
threats and then identify and classify the possible
threats. In Section 4, we assess the impact of the
threats identified in the previous section. Finally,
we present our conclusions in Section 5.
2 Possible biometric system scenar-
ios
Five different scenarios are considered, and the rela-
tive risks associated with each scenario are analysed.
The scenarios cover various possibilities for the dis-
tribution of the modules of the biometric system be-
tween the smartcard and the card reader. Note that
in all cases we assume that the fingerprint template
is stored in the smartcard.
The scenarios are as follows:
S1. The fingerprint sensor is built into the card
reader. The user template is transferred from
card to reader. The reader takes the image
provided by its built-in fingerprint sensor, per-
forms the feature extraction, and also matches
the features to the template provided by the
card. The reader then informs the card whether
or not authentication has been successful.
S2. The fingerprint sensor is built into the card.
The fingerprint image and user template are
transferred from card to reader. The reader
performs feature extraction and matching of
features to the template. The reader then in-
forms the card whether or not authentication
has been successful.
S3. The fingerprint sensor is built into the card
reader. The reader takes the image provided
by the built-in fingerprint sensor and performs
the feature extraction. The extracted features
are sent to the card, which then performs the
matching process and reaches the authentica-
tion decision.
S4. The fingerprint sensor is built into the card.
The fingerprint image is transferred from card
to reader. The reader performs feature extrac-
tion only, and transfers the extracted features
back to the card. The card then performs the
matching process.
S5. All fingerprint processing takes place on the
card.
Figure 2 shows the first four scenarios and their cor-
responding data flow during biometric cardholder
authentication. Table 1 below defines all the scenar-
ios in terms of the location of the various biometric
modules.
3 Security threats
The focus of this paper is on the communications
link between smartcard and card reader, and hence
we only consider threats that relate, directly or indi-
rectly, to this link. The main threats to this link can
be divided into threats to the up-link (i.e. smartcard
to reader) and down-link (i.e. reader to smartcard).
The threats also vary depending on the scenario.
Note that, before identifying the threats to the up
and down links, we briefly consider the possible
source of these threats. Also, as well as identify-
ing threats to the up-link and down-link, we briefly
consider threats to the card reader itself. This is be-
cause the threats to the card reader indirectly relate
to communications link protection (see below).
3.1 Sources of communications link
threats
There would appear to be three main ways in which
an attacker could intercept and/or manipulate data
being transferred between card and card reader.
• The card reader (and/or smartcard) may emit
electromagnetic signals which are data depen-
dent, and which can be intercepted using an an-
tenna located close to the reader. Such an ap-
proach would only enable passive (interception)
rather than active (manipulation/replacement)
attacks. The seriousness of this threat depends
on the design of smartcard and card reader.
• A special interception device could be inserted
into the read slot of the card reader, and the
device would then be located between any in-
serted smartcard and the card reader. By this
means, and without any modifications to the
card reader, both passive and active attacks
may be realised. The seriousness of such a
threat will depend on a variety of factors in-
cluding the design of the card reader and the
environment in which the reader itself is lo-
cated. Observe that, given that the primary
threat would appear to arise from an attacker
equipped with a lost, stolen or borrowed card,
the seriousness of this threat will relate to
whether or not use of the card reader is super-
vised by trusted personnel (who might detect
the use of additional devices).
• The card reader could be modified. At the sim-
plest level this could mean the insertion of a
‘bug’ designed to monitor and perhaps modify
data communications. (See also Section 3.4 be-
low).
We do not discuss the magnitude of these threats
further here, since all three threats are very much
implementation-dependent and therefore any fur-
ther analysis would be highly speculative. How-
ever, it is clear that, wherever possible, card readers
should be designed to minimise these threats, par-
ticularly if sensitive information is transferred be-
tween smartcard and reader without cryptographic
protection.
3.2 Up-link threats
The main up-link threats are as follows:
U1. (S1 and S2 only). Interception (leading to loss
of confidentiality) of the user fingerprint tem-
plate.
U2. (S1 and S2 only). Manipulation (or replace-
ment) of the user fingerprint template.
U3. (S2 and S4 only). Interception (leading to loss
of confidentiality) of the fingerprint image.
U4. (S2 and S4 only). Manipulation (or replace-
ment) of the fingerprint image.
Card Reader
template
yes/no
raw data
features
SCENARIO 1
data
collection
sig. proc.
matching
& decision
storage
Card Reader
template
e
yes/no
raw data
features
SCENARIO 2
data
collection sig. proc.
matching
& decision
storage
Card Reader
template
yes/no
raw data
features
SCENARIO 3
data
collection
sig. proc.matching& decision
storage
Card Reader
template
yes/no
raw data
features
SCENARIO 4
data
collection
sig. proc.matching& decision
storage
Figure 2: Four different scenarios and their corresponding data flow during cardholder authentication.
System modules in smartcard System modules in card reader
Scenario 1 Template storage
Data collection
Signal processing
Matching and Decision
Scenario 2
Template storage
Data collection
Signal processing
Matching and Decision
Scenario 3
Template storage
Matching and Decision
Data collection
Signal processing
Scenario 4
Template storage
Data collection
Matching and Decision
Signal processing
Scenario 5 All modules No modules
Table 1: Five different biometric system scenarios in increasing order of integration of the biometric modules.
Threats U1 and U3 could be addressed by encrypt-
ing the communications path, although the effec-
tiveness of such a measure would depend on the
physical security of the card reader (since keys nec-
essary to decrypt the transferred data would need to
be available to the card reader). Addressing threats
U2 and U4 would require the provision of data
integrity and origin authentication services for the
data transfer between card and reader (e.g. as pro-
vided by a Message Authentication Code (MAC) or
a digital signature — see, for example, [2]).
3.3 Down-link threats
The main down-link threats are as follows:
D1. (S1 and S2 only). Modification of the authen-
tication decision.
D2. (S3 and S4 only). Interception (leading to loss
of confidentiality) of the fingerprint features.
D3. (S3 and S4 only). Manipulation (or replace-
ment) of the fingerprint features.
Threat D2 could be addressed by encrypting the
communications path, although the effectiveness of
such a measure would depend on the means used to
protect the necessary key(s). Addressing threatsD1
andD3 would require the provision of data integrity
and origin authentication services for the data trans-
fer between reader and card (e.g. as provided by a
MAC or a digital signature).
3.4 Threats to card reader
Three main types of threat to the card reader can
be identified. Although these threats are not di-
rectly relevant to smartcard/reader communications
security, they do have indirect relevance (see below).
The three main classes of threat are as follows.
• Manipulation of a genuine card reader. This
includes the insertion of a ‘bug’ (as mentioned
in Section 3.1), but also includes threats where
the operation of the reader is modified, e.g. by
changing stored software.
• Replacement of the card reader. This refers to
the substitution of the genuine reader with a
fraudulent replacement. (Whether or not this
could be achieved without preventing correct
operation of the system depends on both the
card reader design and the design of the re-
mainder of the system).
• Theft and/or reverse engineering of the card
reader. Such a threat could be very serious if
the reader contains secrets on which the system
security depends.
4 Impact of security threats
We next consider the impact of the various threats
identified in the previous section. We divide this
discussion into the following sub-categories:
• threats arising from attempted use of a lost,
stolen or borrowed card;
• threats to integrity of card transactions;
• threats to cardholder privacy.
4.1 Use of lost, stolen or borrowed cards
As a basis of this discussion we assume that the
possessor of a misappropriated (lost, stolen or bor-
rowed) card wishes to make use of this card, e.g. to
perform some kind of transaction. In order to do
so, he/she will need to find some way of ‘fooling’
the cardholder authentication process.
There are a variety of ways this could be achieved,
as follows. Note that in each case we indicate which
threat identified in Section 3 above is giving rise to
the issue.
• Arising from U2 (and hence applying to S1
and S2 only): replace the fingerprint template
as sent on the up-link with a fingerprint tem-
plate belonging to the possessor of the misap-
propriated card.
For such an attack to be viable, the attacker
will need to have a fingerprint template for
his/her own fingerprint in the format used by
the scheme. There are a number of possible
ways in which this could be obtained.
– If the attacker has his/her own card, this
could easily be obtained by monitoring the
output from the attacker’s own card.
– If the attacker knows the type of finger-
print reader in use (either built into the
card reader (S1) or built into the card
(S2)) and the method used to obtain the
template, then the attacker could obtain
a fingerprint reader of this type and use
it, together with appropriate software, to
compute a template.
– The attacker could use a misappropriated
card to obtain a copy (or many copies) of
a fingerprint image (from threatU3— i.e.
S2 only) for his/her own fingerprint. With
knowledge of the method used to extract a
template, together with appropriate soft-
ware, the attacker could compute a tem-
plate.
If U2 is realisable, then this risk has to be clas-
sified as high, since, for many systems, protect-
ing one cardholder against another fraudulent
cardholder is a necessary requirement.
• Arising from U4 (and hence applying to S2
and S4 only): replace the fingerprint image as
sent on the up-link with a fingerprint image be-
longing to the legitimate cardholder.
For such an attack to be viable, the attacker
will need to have a fingerprint image for the
genuine cardholder. There are a number of pos-
sible ways in which this could be obtained.
– From threat U3 (and hence applying to
S2 and S4 only). Note that this would
require threatU3 to be realised before the
time of misappropriation. This may not
be easy to arrange.
– If the attacker knows how the fingerprint
reader in use operates, and has access to a
fingerprint image of some kind for the gen-
uine user (e.g. by taking an image from an
object touched by the genuine cardholder)
then it may be possible to transform this
latter image into one conforming to the
scheme in use.
If U4 and U3 are realisable for the same card,
then this risk has to be classified as high. Note
that even if both threats are realisable, success-
fully taking advantage of both threats with re-
spect to the same card may be much more dif-
ficult. If U4 is realisable but not U3, then the
risk is lower — say medium — depending on
the details of the fingerprint imaging technol-
ogy being used.
• Arising from D1 (and hence applying to S1
and S2 only): change the authentication de-
cision sent from reader to card from ‘Reject’ to
‘Accept’.
This is trivially easy to perform (given that
threat D1 is realised). If D1 is realisable, then
this risk has to be classified as very high.
• Arising from D3 (and hence applying to S3
and S4 only): replace the fingerprint features
sent on the down-link with features extracted
from the cardholder’s fingerprint.
For such an attack to be viable, the attacker
will need to have a copy of fingerprint features
for a fingerprint of the genuine cardholder in
the format used by the scheme. There are a
number of possible ways in which this could be
obtained.
– From threat D2 (and hence applying to
S3 and S4 only). Note that this would
require threatD2 to be realised before the
time of misappropriation. This may not
be easy to arrange.
– If the attacker knows how the fingerprint
feature extraction method in use operates,
and has access to a fingerprint image of
some kind for the genuine user (e.g. by re-
alising threat U3 before the time of mis-
appropriation, or by taking an image from
an object touched by the genuine card-
holder) then it may be possible to derive a
workable set of features conforming to the
scheme in use.
If D3 and D2 are realisable for the same card,
then this risk has to be classified as high. Note
that even if both threats are realisable, success-
fully taking advantage of both threats with re-
spect to the same card may be much more dif-
ficult. If D3 is realisable but not D2, then
the risk is lower — say medium — depending
on the details of the fingerprint imaging and
feature extraction technology being used. Note
also that threat D3 could be reduced if a secret
feature extraction technique is used — for this
to be effective the card readers in use would
need to possess physical security features (see
Section 3.4). Threat D3 could also be reduced
(if not eliminated) if it was possible for the card
to verify that the fingerprint features provided
by the card reader indeed belong to the image
provided to the card reader.
Note that none of these threats apply to scenario S5,
which is not prone to attack on the communications
path since this path is not used for the cardholder
authentication process.
We summarise the results of the above analysis in
Table 2.
4.2 Card transaction integrity
Whilst there may be many risks to the integrity of
card transactions, we restrict our attention here to
the impact of threats to the card/reader communi-
cations link.
The only impact which results from the analysis de-
scribed here is an indirect one. If any of the threats
relevant to the particular scenario are realisable,
then this may give a cardholder the ability to dis-
pute transactions after they have occurred. That
is, if a fraudulent cardholder knows of the existence
of certain threats which would allow successful use
of a lost, stolen or borrowed card, then the card-
holder could, after completion of a genuine transac-
tion, claim that the transaction had been performed
by someone else using a lost, stolen or borrowed
card.
4.3 Cardholder privacy threats
The other main area of impact of the threats identi-
fied in Section 3 is to the privacy of the cardholder.
That is, the cardholder may have concerns relating
to who has access to information relating to his or
her fingerprint. Note that we are concerned here
purely with privacy concerns, unrelated to any pos-
sible threat of fraud.
The following impacts arise from the identified
threats.
• Arising from U1 (and hence applying to S1
and S2 only): loss of confidentiality of user fin-
gerprint template.
• Arising from U3 (and hence applying to S2
and S3 only): loss of confidentiality of user fin-
gerprint image.
• Arising from D2 (and hence applying to S3
and S4 only): loss of confidentiality of user fin-
gerprint features.
The three impacts are rather similar to one another,
and all have an impact on user privacy. The choice
of scenario (apart from the fact that S5 is unaf-
fected) has little bearing on the degree of the im-
pact.
5 Conclusions
The main purpose of the analysis in this paper is to
understand how to integrate biometric cardholder
authentication with a smartcard in the most cost ef-
fective manner. In particular we have sought to un-
derstand what is to be gained from the various pos-
sible levels of integration of biometric system with
the smartcard.
First and foremost it is clear that scenario S5 is un-
affected by the security of the communications path
since in that scenario the card/reader communica-
tions path is not used (at least for the cardholder
authentication process). Thus scenario S5 is clearly
the best in an absolute sense — however it is also
likely to be the most costly to deploy. It is there-
fore interesting to understand how the other four
scenarios compare, bearing in mind that, of these
four, scenario S1 is likely to be the cheapest option
and scenario S4 the most expensive, since they rep-
resent the lowest and the highest level of integration
respectively.
For the other four scenarios, the cardholder privacy
threat is very similar regardless of the scenario. The
main issue would appear to be fraudulent use of
misappropriated cards.
Of scenarios S1, S2, S3 and S4, it would ap-
pear that scenarios S1 and S2 are very similar
with respect to their vulnerability to attacks on the
card/reader communications path. The degree to
which scenarios S3 and S4 reduce the risk depends
Scenario Degree of risk
S1
Very high (if D1 realisable).
High (if U2 realisable).
S2
Very high (if D1 realisable).
High (if U2 realisable).
High (if U3 and U4 realisable for the same card).
Medium (if U4 realisable).
S3
High (if D2 and D3 realisable for the same card).
Medium (if D3 realisable).
S4
High (if U3 and U4 realisable for the same card).
High (if D2 and D3 realisable for the same card).
Medium (if D3 realisable).
S5 None.
Table 2: Summary of impacts of misappropriated cards.
partly on technical issues relating to the format and
use of fingerprint images and features, and also de-
pending on how easy it would be to both steal a
card and monitor its use prior to its theft.
S4 represents a higher level of integration of the bio-
metric system with the smartcard than S3. How-
ever the integration of the fingerprint sensor with
the smartcard in S4 makes the system vulnerable
to threats U3 and U4 in the uplink. From that
point of view, S4 would appear to be an architecture
more open to attacks than S3. Note, however, that
when the fingerprint sensor is built into the card
reader, the system becomes vulnerable to threats to
the card reader (see Section 3.4). As suggested in
[9], a fake card reader could be used to record the
biometric data of legitimate users in an attack sim-
ilar to a false ATM attack, which may potentially
be an attack more easily realisable and more dam-
aging than threats U3 and U4. Moreover, given
that the sensor is a fragile piece of equipment, in-
tegrating the sensor with the card reader is not a
viable solution for many applications since it makes
the system vulnerable to vandalism.
The gain to be derived from integrating the finger-
print sensor with the smartcard is minimal if all fin-
gerprint feature extraction and matching are done
off the card. However, depending on the environ-
ment, significant gains can be achieved as long as
the matching is performed on card, even when the
feature extraction is performed off-card.
It is interesting to note that almost all the most se-
rious threats arise from an assumed lack of integrity
for the data link. If it is assumed that the card
reader is a trusted device and has not been inter-
fered with or replaced (see also Section 3.4), then
guaranteeing the integrity of the link between the
card reader and the card would effectively prevent
all the threats, even in the absence of any confiden-
tiality for data transferred.
Finally note that, given that the threats discussed
mostly relate to use of misappropriated cards, the
use of secure auditing and blacklisting measures
within the application can help to minimise the im-
pact of such threats.
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